December 5, 2021


Only The Finest Women

The EU fiscal framework: The case for reform

Niels Thygesen, Roel Beetsma, Massimo Bordignon, Xavier Debrun, Mateusz Szczurek, Martin Larch, Matthias Busse, Mateja Gabrijelcic, Laszlo Jankovics, Janis Malzubris 10 November 2021

On 10 November 2021, the European Fiscal Board (EFB) released its new once-a-year report (EFB 2021). The report gives an evaluation of the immediate fiscal coverage response to the Covid-19 disaster and further more updates the EFB’s reform proposal for the EU fiscal framework to account for post-pandemic realities. The deep contraction of in excess of 6% – unprecedented in its severity considering the fact that WWII – invalidated earlier coverage programs, which in quite a few situations contained unambitious fiscal targets, in certain for significant-debt countries. 

The Covid-19 affect on general public funds in the EU

An express provision was launched in the Stability and Progress Pact (SGP) in 2011 to cater for Covid-like symmetric calamities, the ‘severe financial downturn clause’ (in the community discussion normally identified as the ‘general escape clause’). Its swift, and very 1st, activation, in conjunction with the equally swift reaction of the ECB by using the pandemic emercency acquire programme (PEPP), provided the vital home for plan manoeuvre. Commencing from March 2020, Member States have almost all enacted large disaster-reduction packages, so the budgetary impact was additional pronounced than immediately after earlier major economic shocks, with the deficits exceeding 9% of GDP in several Member States (see Determine 1). This strong fiscal response coupled with the sharp drop in economic exercise led to an equally unprecedented boost in authorities personal debt-to-GDP ratios by in excess of 13 proportion details on regular. Member States with the best financial debt right before the crisis recorded the most significant jumps in credit card debt ratios, also connected to the actuality that they took place to be especially hard strike by the pandemic.

Figure 1 Federal government balances in 2020 by country

Notice: Estimates of the structural price range harmony are surrounded by uncertainty as they involve forecasts of actual GDP. They are possible to be revised when new information develop into out there. 
Resource: European Commission’s spring 2021 financial forecast.

Overall, the swift and forceful response of equally fiscal and financial authorities was warranted. It stands in sharp distinction to what happened in the wake of the world wide economic and economic crisis and was, devoid of question, instrumental in softening the economic and social fallout of the pandemic, at minimum for the brief term. At the identical time, the coverage response underscored at minimum two essential and interlinked challenges in the EU fiscal surveillance framework: the notorious failure or issue on the portion of some Member States to make fiscal buffers in fantastic economic times, adopted by the tendency to find new typically kinds of versatility in the implementation of the EU fiscal rules or through new components of chance sharing when occasions transform negative.   

As was discussed in earlier EFB experiences (e.g. Thygesen et al. 2020), not all Member States had taken edge of the protracted recovery from the international financial and monetary crisis to improve general public funds. A sizeable number of euro location Member States entered the pandemic with a financial debt-to-GDP ratio effectively above pre-2007 levels and experienced extra confined or no budgetary leeway for responding to an additional important economic shock. In light of the truly exogenous character of the pandemic, common EU initiatives produced room for manoeuvre for this latter team of nations as nicely. In specific, next hard negotiations in the Council the EU begun the Future Generation EU (NGEU) initiative, which requires sizeable cross-place transfers. In addition, the ECB’s PEPP programme incredibly significantly helped mitigate early signs of tension on specific euro space sovereigns and stabilise yields at low levels. Nonetheless, as Determine 2 demonstrates, international locations with considerably less fiscal headroom mobilised a comparatively smaller sized boost in federal government expenditure in 2020 it stays legitimate when one particular will take into account the effect of the various liquidity aid techniques, this kind of as the federal government-assured lending programmes.

Determine 2 Internet expenditure growth in 2020 (state teams by fiscal positions)

Notes: (1) The medium-time period rate of potential GDP expansion is in nominal phrases. It is calculated as the 10-calendar year common of true opportunity output progress costs in addition the GDP deflator, taken as an average in excess of the very same 10-yr period. (2) Fiscal room reflects the variance concerning the believed structural price range stability and the medium-phrase aim (MTO).  The fiscal house for Greece is established to zero thanks to fiscal commitments taken at the finish of the economic programme. (3) Web expenditure advancement refers to the progress price of authorities expenditure in 2020 excluding some products (desire expenditure, expenditure on EU programmes entirely matched by EU funds income, and the cyclical portion of unemployment profit expenditure) and is internet of discretionary revenue actions and one particular-offs. Expense expenditures are averaged more than four years. (4) Lower debt nations around the world = EE, LU, BG, CZ, SE, DK, RO, LT, LV, MT, PL Substantial personal debt nations around the world = NL, IE, SK, FI, DE, HU, SI, AT, HR Really large credit card debt nations around the world = CY, FR, BE, ES, PT, IT, EL.
Resource: European Commission’s spring 2021 economic forecasts, EFB calculations.

To accommodate the fiscal reaction within just the EU fiscal rules, the Fee and the Council started out early on to explore various flexibility selections. They immediately agreed to vacation resort to the extreme economic downturn clause. Despite the fact that further flexiblity was needed, the way conclusions were being taken highlights troubles in the implemenation of a guidelines-based procedure. In individual, even though made to grant some flexibility on a state-by-state foundation around the requiremens of the SGP, the severe financial downturn clause was communicated and used like a basic waiver with out real differentiation across nations. Next, the timing or situations for its deactivation ended up not addressed till spring 2021, which in convert experienced been singled out by a range of unbiased fiscal institutions as complicating variables to provide advice to nationwide bugdetary authorities. On top of that, official Commission documents rightly insisted that the activation of the clause did not suggest the suspension of the SGP. Even so, the Fee and the Council made the decision, citing the significant diploma of uncertainty surrounding the financial outlook, not to start any procedural follow-up when they assessed clear cases of non-compliance, notably abnormal deficits. This tactic was dependent on political things to consider rather than set up observe or precedents. Abnormal deficit methods (EDPs) were being customarily opened for straightforward breaches of the deficit criterion. At the current juncture, EDPs are obviously not to be employed as an instrument of frontloaded and abrupt fiscal adjustment, but could still present plan steering and reliability for the medium time period. The in depth interpretation of the severe economic downturn clause, which as explained over gave increase to diverging interpretations as to the procedural comply with-up and the modalities of deactivation, is a notably seen symptom of the fundamental obstacle in the current arrangements of EU fiscal surveillance: within the limits imposed by the Treaty, discretion (when backed by the needed vast majority in the Council) trumps principles. A extra organic and natural review of the recent established of flexibilty clauses, having into account the lessons learnt, is needed. 

The scenario for a swift and comprehensive reform

The pandemic understandably froze the financial governance review system initiated in early 2020 its current relaunch by the Commission was well timed and extra than welcome. Irrespective of divergent perceptions amid Member States as to how to return to a regulations-based mostly fiscal framework, the EFB believes in the significance of wide-ranging improvements. Our reform proposal organised all over a few central components: i) a medium-time period personal debt anchor ii) an expenditure rule as the most important coverage instrument and iii) a solitary escape clause applied on the foundation of unbiased assessment. It was essentially laid out in element before the outburst of the pandemic (Beetsma et al. 2018, EFB 2019), and it acquired much more relevance write-up-Covid. In fact, there is an emerging technology of reform blueprints that are identical to the EFB’s.

The EFB is a potent advocate of retaining reference values, as crystal clear and recognisable numerical goalposts participate in an crucial function in any reliable fiscal framework. They offer tangible focal details for general public debates and a foundation for final decision-makers’ accountability in the fiscal area. Concretely, the 3% of GDP deficit threshold remains a valuable backstop against unsustainable debt dynamics. The headline deficit is observable, effortless to interpret, and uniformly applicable to all EU countries. It should really continue to be the principal triggering position for examining the option to initiate corrective actions in a revised framework.

A revised EU fiscal framework should preferably be complemented by extra coverage levers improving its resilience and robustness. Further than the update of EU fiscal rules, there are other lengthy-overdue governance reforms in the EU, most notably the generation of a central fiscal ability and schemes to advertise public investments, these types of as augmenting the EU spending plan by committed nationwide envelopes for offering EU common goods. The availability of a joint fiscal potential is all the much more crucial when monetary coverage is constrained by the powerful reduced sure and some Member States wrestle with holding general public finances on a sustainable route. Conditioning the entry to the popular instrument to compliance with the fiscal framework may possibly further more persuade fiscal duty across the EU. The a short while ago recognized NGEU facility is composed partly of budgetary transfers, with strings connected as to how they can be expended and to what reforms must be pursued, also with a check out to reverse the development of declining federal government investment and to boost the excellent of general public funds. The jury is continue to out no matter whether this initiative remains a one-off or it will direct to lasting institutional adjustments.

In a state of affairs of no key improvements to the SGP, EU establishments should really spell out transparently how the needed versatility and constrained discretion vis-à-vis the ‘Maastricht numbers’ will be used in the coming period of time. Most importantly, the boundaries of overall flexibility ought to be clarified. In this vein, plan channelling of the end result of bilateral negotiations amongst the Fee and countrywide governments by means of the Council must be abandoned. 

Preferably, impartial fiscal institutions should enjoy a increased purpose in the EU surveillance process, in certain exterior the corrective arm. Even though better reliance on region-unique guidance by nationwide IFIs can have its very clear positive aspects, the EFB sees restrictions to the reform avenue of significant decentralisation. In a broad sense, national fiscal establishments continue to be too heterogeneous in the EU to consistently condition the conduct of fiscal coverage. This perception is corroborated by our annual report’s analysis of the early ordeals with the national correction mechanisms. Absent a aware effort to harmonise the position and features of these entities, the Commission’s and the Council’s position in checking performance and formulating tips will continue being essential. 

Reforming the framework in time would serve the passions of both teams of Member States: those people eager to steer clear of a even more erosion of the rules-dependent program, and all those ready to exploit overall flexibility in a productive manner. By distinction, a lot less predictable fiscal coverage only tends to make sudden risk repricing by monetary markets additional probable. Given the two many years record of discretionary and hard-to-forecast tweaks in the implementation of the current SGP rule e book, reforming truly the fiscal framework appears to be a far far better solution.


Beetsma, R, N Thygesen, A Cugnasca, E Orseau, P Eliofotou and S Santacroce (2018), “Reforming the EU fiscal framework: A proposal by the European Fiscal Board”,, 26 October.

Bénassy-Quéré, A, M Brunnermeier, H Enderlein, E Farhi, M Fratzscher, C Fuest, P-O Gourinchas, P Martin, J Pisani-Ferry, H Rey, I Schnabel, N Veron, B Weder di Mauro and J Zettelmeyer (2018), “Reconciling threat sharing with market place self-discipline: A constructive approach to euro location reform”, CEPR Plan Perception No 91.

Darvas, Zs, P Martin, and X Ragot (2018), “European fiscal policies call for a key overhaul”, Bruegel Coverage Contribution No. 18.

EFB – European Fiscal Board (2019), “Assessment of EU fiscal procedures with a target on the 6 and two-pack legislation”.

EFB (2021), Annual Report 2021.

Martin, P, J Pisani-Ferry and X Ragot (2021), “Reforming the European Fiscal Framework”, Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique No 63., Conseil d’Analyse Économique

Thygesen, N, R Beetsma, M Bordignon, X Debrun, M Szczurek, M Larch, M Busse, M Gabrijelcic, E Orseau and S Santacroce (2020), “Reforming the EU fiscal framework: Now is the time” ,, 26 Oct.